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NOTES
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF ORAL
CONTRACTS TO DEVISE
I. INTRODUcTION
The courts are continually confronted with oral contracts to
devise. Most involve promises to devise in return for services to
be rendered by the promisee, while others involve mutual prom-
ises to make specified dispositions by respective wills. Many such
contracts are between parties with close family ties, and their
mutual confidence that each will perform his promise without
resort to the courts is usually well founded.
The purpose of this note is to explore the remedy of specific
performance of oral contracts to devise-the remedy most often
sought when the promisor does fail to make the promised will,
or having made it, breaks his promise by revoking the will or
alienating the property to defeat the devise. Particular emphasis
is given to part performance which is generally relied on to
remove the agreement from the operation of the Statute of
Frauds. The cases are numerous and the results are often deter-
mined by the particular facts of each case.
IL. Spcirio PERroRwAxcE GENERALLY
The remedy of specific performance enables a court with
equity power to compel at least substantial performance of a
contract.' However, neither party to the contract has an absolute
right to this remedy; the court may grant or refuse it in its dis-
cretion. A court of equity will usually only accept jurisdiction
when ample remedy is unavailable in a court of law.2 Even then
a decree will be granted only when damages would otherwise be
inadequate." Equity also requires that the contract possess all
the essential elements of a legal contract 4 and that it be capable
of enforcement in a court of law.5
1. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1418 (rev. ed. 1937).
2. This principle is true as much in actions for specific performance of con-
tracts to make a will as in other contracts. E.g., Flowers v. Roberts, 220 S.C.
110, 66 S.E.2d 612 (1951) ; Samuel v. Young, 214 S.C. 91, 51 S.E.2d 367 (1949).
3. Sarter v. Gordon, 2 Hill Eq. 121 (S.C. 1835).
4. Brown v. Graham, 242 S.C. 491, 131 S.E.2d 421 (1963).
5. Brown v. Graham, supra note 4; Baylor v. Bath, 189 S.C. 269, 1 S.E.2d
139 (1938); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1421 (rev. ed. 1937).
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Specific performance is most often sought in land conveyance
contracts. Partly due to the social and economic importance of
land during the development of the doctrines of equity, and part-
ly due to the uniqueness of any one particular tract, land con-
tracts are always specifically enforceable. They are enforceable
by either party regardless of the form of the contract and de-
spite the fact that either could sue for damages."
Land devise contracts and land sale contracts are similar in
nature,7 as both involve the transfer of an interest in land, and it
would appear that specific performance should be granted for
the same reason in both cases.
It is well settled that one can make an enforceable contract to
dispose of property by will.8 However, there can be no breach
until the death of the promisor, and even then the remedy at
law may be adequate. 9 Therefore, equity will usually not grant
specific performance during the promisor's life. Nevertheless, it
may prevent a disposition of the land during the promisor's life
if relief by a court of law after the promisor's death would be
inadequate. 10 Further, the South Carolina Supreme Court has
prevented a transfer by injunction during the promisor's life if
the promisor has repudiated the contract.1 1 But if the property
has been transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value, equity
is unable to enforce performance, as it will against one who is not
a bona fide purchaser for value.12 The promisor's only remedy
is then at law for damages or, when there is no writing to meet
6. Board of Presbyterian Church v. Dreher, 185 S.C. 65, 193 S.E. 189
(1937) ; Anderson v. Chick, Bailey's Eq. 118 (1830).
7. White v. McKnight, 146 S.C. 59, 143 S.E. 552 (1928); Brown v. Go-
lightly, 106 S.C. 519, 91 S.E. 869 (1917).
8. E.g., Brown v. Golightly, 106 S.C. 519, 91 S.E. 869 (1917); Wilson v.
Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79 (1905) ; Gary v. James, 4 Desaus. Eq. 185 (S.C.
1811).
By this agreement he has renounced that absolute power of disposing of his
estate at his pleasure, or even at his caprice, with which the law had clothed
him: and I cannot doubt that he could bind himself to do so. No cases were
cited on this point. But there are cases which shew that men may bind
themselves to make their wills in a particular way ... a man may re-
nounce every power, benefit, or right, which the laws give him, and he
will be bound by his agreement to do so, provided the agreement be entered
into fairly, without surprise, imposition, or fraud, and that it be reasonable
and moral.
Rivers v. Executors of Rivers, 3 Desaus. Eq. 190, 194-95 (S.C. 1811).
9. 5 Wn.usToNr, CoNTRAcTs § 1421 (rev. ed. 1937).
10. Ibid.
11. Sizemore v. Jennings, 88 S.C. 243, 70 S.E. 726 (1911).
12. Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1900).
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the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, in quantum meruit.13
The court has further held that if no time for making the will is
set, there is no implication that it is to be made during the prom-
isor's life; and no action for breach or rescission will lie unless
he repudiates the contract and puts it out of his power to per-
form.14 Nevertheless, although a contract is usually unenforce-
able both in law and in equity only against a contracting party,
the courts construe contracts to devise or bequeath as imposing
a trust upon the property, compelling not only the heirs or per-
sonal representatives but others holding under them with notice
of the trust to transfer the land or other subject matter to the
promisee.15
The same requirements for enforcing contracts apply to equity
as apply to law, and one requirement in law is that any appli-
cable Statute of Frauds be complied with. Therefore, on prin-
ciple, the requirement of compliance with the Statute of Frauds
should apply with equal force in equity cases. However, equity
has created an exception to this statutory requirement where the
promisee of an oral contract to devise has partly performed.
Although in most instances an action for specific performance
is brought by the promisee, the contract may involve a promise
to devise to a third party who may sue as a third party bene-
ficiary.'0
III. ORA CONTRAcTS AND SPECMIo PEXXOROiNCE
A. The Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds requires that certain classes of contracts
either be in writing or that there be some writing signed by the
party to be changed showing its essential elements. The Statute
of Frauds contained in the South Carolina Code s is similar to
those enacted in most other states.
13. White v. McKnight, 146 S.C. 59, 143 S.E. 552 (1928); Bruce v. Moon,
57 S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1900).
14. Harmon v. Aughtry, 226 S.C. 371, 85 S.E2d 284 (1955).
15. Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S.C. 559, 35 S.E. 757 (1900) ; Annot., 69 A.L.R.
14, 26 (1930).
16. Ellisor v. Watts, 227 S.C. 411, 88 S.E.2d 351 (1955) ; McMillan v. King,
193 S.C. 14, 7 S.E.2d 521 (1940); Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S.C. 122, 117 S.E.
192 (1923) ; Brown v. Golightly, 106 S.C. 519, 91 S.E. 869 (1917); Wilson v.
Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 59 (1905).
17. White v. McKnight, 146 S.C. 59, 143 S.E. 552 (1928); Brown v. Go-
lightly, 106 S.C. 519, 91 S.E. 869 (1917).
18. S.C. CoDE AxN. § 11-101 (1962).
[Vol. 17
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§ 11-101 Agreements required to be in writing-no action
shall be brought whereby:
(4) To charge any person upon any contract for sale of
lands, tenements or hereditaments or any interest in or con-
cerning them; or
. . . Unless the agreement upon which such action shall
be brought or some memorandum or note thereof shall
be in writing signed by the party to be charged therewith
or some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. 19
B. Doctrine of Part Performance
The doctrine of part performance provides an exception to the
general rule and allows a court of equity to decree specific per-
formance despite non-compliance with the statute. However, the
doctrine is available only when the value of services rendered
by the promisee cannot be estimated in monetary terms or where
inequity or injustice would otherwise result.2 0 The Statute of
Frauds is designed to prevent fraud, and only when enforcement
of the statute would result in fraud do the courts allow a de-
parture from it.2 1 In other cases the doctrine of part performance
is said to be based on estoppel.2 2 And the courts may also grant
specific performance on the theory of equitable ownership.2 3 At
all events, part performance is purely an equitable doctrine and
will not support an action at law for damages.
In Fogle v. St. Michael Church24 the court said that a con-
tract to devise is enforced upon the same principles as a contract
19. It would seem obvious that the provisions of the Statute of Frauds relat-
ing to promises not to be performed within a year does not affect agreements to
make a certain disposition of property by will, since the promisor might die
within the year. However, the early case of Izard v. Middleton, 1 Desaus. Eq.
116 (S.C. 1785), held such a promise to be within the one year clause. This
holding was later overruled in Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S.C. 559, 35 S.E. 757
(1900).
20. 3 WILussTor, CONTRcTs § 488 (3d ed. 1960).
21. McLauchlin v. Gressette, 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E.2d 149 (1953).
The stringent rule of the quantum of proof required results (when the al-
leged contract rests in parol) from the fact that such a contract is in the
teeth of the Statute of Frauds and specific performance (or its equivalent)
is properly allowable only when enforcement of that statute would result
in a fraud upon the promisee. Only in prevention of fraud do Courts allow
a violation of the statute.
Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 15, 32 S.E.2d 889, 894 (1945).
22. McMillan v. King, 193 S.C. 14, 7 S.E.2d 521 (1940).
23. Fogle v. St. Michael Church, 48 S.C. 86, 26 S.E. 99 (1896) ; McLauchlin
v. Gressette, 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E.2d 149 (1953).
24. 48 S.C. 86, 26 S.E. 99 (1896).
Noms1965]
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss4/8
SouTH CAROLiNA LAW RnVmW
to convey, and that a judgment for specific performance relates
back to the time of the making of the contract, giving the con-
tract priority over a subsequent contrary will.
As has been seen, specific performance of an oral contract to
devise can only be enforced against the promisor during his life-
time. Therefore, if specific performance based upon part per-
formance is to be granted, the same rule applies as in cases of a
written contract, and after the promisor's death the court will
construe the agreement as impressing a trust upon the property
and will compel the heirs or others holding the property with
notice of the trust, to convey to the promisee.25 The court will
not allow this remedy to be defeated by the promisor's convey-
ance of the land unless the rights of purchasers are deserving of
protection.
20
G. Establishing The Contract
While the courts sustain contracts to make testamentary dis-
positions, they are reluctant to find such a contract when it rests
in parol.2 7 They are sympathetic with the promisor's right to
convey his property and to change his beneficiaries, and recog-
nize that a contract to devise partially deprives the promisor of
the enjoyment of his property.28 Consequently, the court requires
a high degree of evidence to establish an oral contract to devise.29
There must be clear and convincing evidence,30 not only that
the contract was made but that the promisee has performed his
part. 1 A mere preponderance of the evidence is insufficient.3 2
25. Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1900).
26. White v. McKnight, 146 S.C. 59, 143 S.E. 552 (1928) ; Bruce v. Moon,
mupra note 25; Fogle v. St. Michael Church, 48 S.C. 86, 26 S.E. 99 (1896).
27. Kerr v. Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 90 S.E. 177 (1916); Dicks v. Cassels,
100 S.C. 341, 84 S.E. 878 (1915) ; McKeegan v. O'Neill, 22 S.C. 454 (1885).
28. Kerr v. Kennedy, supra note 27; Dicks v. Cassels, supra note 27.
29. In Brown v. Golightly, 106 S.C. 519, 91 S.E. 869 (1916) the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court said that an oral contract to devise could not be established
by parol evidence alone and that there had to be some writing to take it out of
the statute of frauds. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Hydrick stated that
such a contract could be proved by parol evidence. He reasoned that if part
performance of a land contract could take a case out of the Statute of Frauds,
then part performance of a contract to devise land should have the same effect.
The concurring opinion has prevailed in South Carolina. See footnote 76 infra.
30. Brown v. Golightly, supra note 29; Kerr v. Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 90
S.E. 117 (1916) ; Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S.C. 341, 84 S.E. 878 (1915) ; Wilson v.
Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 59 (1905). The court sometimes says the evidence
must be "clear, cogent and convincing." See Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C. 497, 131
S.E.2d 506 (1963) ; Kerr v. Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 90 S.E. 177 (1916).
31. Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C. 497, 131 S.E.2d 506 (1963) ; Kerr v. Kennedy,
supra note 30.
32. Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1945).
[Vol. 17
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Findings of fact by the master in equity that are concurred in
by the circuit judge will not be disturbed on appeal unless such
findings are without evidentiary support.33 This rule appears
to run counter to the general requirement that the evidence be
clear and convincing. 4
The terms of the contract must be definite and certain,3 5 and
must possess all the essential elements of a legal contract.
6 It
must have been deliberately entered into by the decedent,
founded upon valuable consideration,3 7 and not violative of law
or public policy.33 A mere declaration of intent will not give rise
to a contract. 39 The minds of the parties must meet. The promisor
must understand that not only is he promising to perform a
future act, but that he is presently relinquishing his right to
change his mind and is entering into an irrevocable contract.
40
The intention of the parties can be determined from the sur-
rounding circumstances as well as from testimony of witnesses,
and subsequent acts may show that no contract was intended."'
The evidence to sustain an oral contract to devise is closely
scrutiized.42 Although no particular number of witnesses is
33. Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C. 497, 131 S.E.2d 506 (1963).
34. See Karesh, Wills and Trusts, 1963-1964 Survey of S.C. Law, 17
S.C.L.REv. 178, 180 (1965).
35. Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S.C. 341, 84 S.E. 878 (1915); Wilson v. Gordon,
73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79 (1905).
36. Brown v. Graham, 242 S.C. 491, 131 S.E2d 421 (1963); Baylor v. Bath,
189 S.C. 269, 1 S.E.2d 139 (1938).
37. Erskine v. Erskine, 107 S.C. 233, 92 S.E. 465 (1917); McKeegan v.
O'Neill, 22 S.C. 454 (1885).
38. Grant v. Butt, 198 S.C. 298, 17 S.E.2d 689 (1941). The plaintiff was either
a Negro woman or part Negro and part Indian. She contended that she had
lived with decedent, a white man, for over 30 years in a state of concubinage,
in return for his oral promise to leave her one-half of his estate by will. The
court held the contract void stating that the courts of this state will not lend
aid to the enforcement of a contract that is in violation of law or opposed to
sound public policy.
39. Bruce v. Green, 118 S.C. 27, 110 S.E. 77 (1921); Kerr v. Kennedy, 105
S.C. 496, 90 S.E. 177 (1916) ; Callum v. Rice, 35 S.C. 551, 15 S.E. 268 (1892).
40. Kerr v. Kennedy, supra note 39.
41. In Kerr v. Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 502-03, 90 S.E. 177, 178-79 (1916),
the court, speaking of the opinion of the circuit judge said, "He ignored entirely
the environment and circumstances of the whole case.... The subsequent acts
of the parties themselves show that they considered it not a binding irrevocable
contract, but simply a declaration of intention." Accord, Hayes v. Israel, 242
S.C. 497, 131 S.E.2d 506 (1963); Brown v. Graham, 242 S.C. 491, 131 S.E.2d
421 (1963) (Plaintiff bought 15 acres of the land from the heirs of the dece-
dent, and claimed decedent contracted to devise to him) ; Ellisor v. Watts, 227
S.C. 411, 88 S.E.2d 351 (1955); Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 223 S.C. 357, 75
S.E.2d 876 (1953); Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S.C. 122, 117 S.E. 192 (1923);
Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79 (1905).
42. Erskine v. Erskine, 107 S.C. 233, 92 S.E. 465 (1917).
1965] Nows
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necessary if the testimony is clear and convincing, 43 the promisee
is not competent to testify as to the terms of the agreement be-
cause of the "dead man statute."4 4 However, if the defendant
does not object it will be admitted and given the weight of other
testimony.
45
It is well settled that a revoked will which does not refer to
the oral contract to devise does not satisfy the Statute of
Frauds,-4 6 and the existence of a will with contrary provisions
may raise the inference that there was no contract 47 particu-
larly where it makes a fair distribution of the estate among the
natural objects of the testator's bounty.48 A will or written con-
tract creates a strong implication that the whole intention has
been expressed and that there was no contrary agreement or
intention. 9
The concurrent execution of separate wills with reciprocal
provisions or identical dispositions is not alone sufficient to
establish a contract between the makers. There must be proof of
the contract from another source. 50 This is particularly true in
the case of a husband and wife because many couples make
reciprocal wills without contracting to do so.51 If an executed
will does refer to the terms of the agreement, however, it may
43. Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S.C. 122, 117 S.E. 192 (1923).
44. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 26-401 (1962); Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d
889 (1945); Stuckey v. Truett, supra note 43; Brown v. Golightly, 106 S.C.
519, 91 S.E. 869 (1917) ; Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S.C. 341, 84 S.E. 878 (1915).
45. Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C. 497, 131 S.E.2d 506 (1963); Riddle v. George,
181 S.C. 360, 187 S.E. 524 (1936).
46. Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1945); McMillan v. King,
193 S.C. 14, 7 S.E.2d 521 (1940); White v. McKnight, 146 S.C. 59, 143 S.E.
552 (1928).
47. McLaughlin v. Gressette, 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E.2d 49 (1953); Young v.
Levy supra note 46; McMillan v. King, supra note 46; Annots. 69 A.L.R. 14,
210 61930) and 106 A.L.R. 742, 766 (1937).
48. Only in prevention of fraud do Courts allow a violation of the statute.
Furthermore, sometimes, as in the case where there was a subsequent con-
trary will, the granting of the relief sought would result in denying the
deceased the power of disposing of his property by last will as he sees fit,
which is a prime right ... of the possessor of property. Here the latter
has a special appeal to a Court of equity for the testator had accumulated
a considerable estate by his industry and thrift. So many of his race are
"under-privileged." By his own efforts, he was not.
Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 15, 32 S.E.2d 889, 894 (1945).
49. Young v. Levy, .supra note 48; Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S.C. 341, 84 S.E.
878 (1915) ; Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79 (1905).
50. Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C. 497, 131 S.E.2d 506 (1963) ; Looper v. Whit-
aker, 231 S.C. 219, 98 S.E.2d 266 (1957) ; Ellisor v. Watts, 227 S.C. 411, 88
S.E.2d 351 (1955).
51. Looper v. Whitaker, 231 S.C. 219 98 S.E.2d 266 (1957).
Vol. 17
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be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds.5 2
D. Personal Sevices as Past Performance
1. Character of the services. For specific performance to be
granted, it must appear that the services performed by the prom-
isee are of an exceptional character. Not only must the parties
have intended that the services not be measured by ordinary
monetary standards, but measurements by such standards must
be impossible.5" The services anticipated by this rule are gen-
erally those of a personal nature 4 and must appear to be excep-
tional in character or involve a change in the whole course of the
promisee's life.55
The factual situations most often involve the sick, aged or in-
firm who have promised to devise in return for some close rela-
tive's5" moving into their home and caring for them. The law
furnishes no monetary standard by which these services may be
valued and equity can only decree specific performance. 57
As a general rule, the promisee must have completely per-
formed unless, through no fault of his own, complete perform-
ance has become impossible.58 At all events, the promisee must
perform the promised services diligently and in good faith. 9
52. Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1900).
53. Under these circumstances, our Supreme Court has consistently...
recognized ... that the Statute is not a bar to specific performance. This
is especially true where, as here, neither the legal benefit to the promisor
nor the legal detriment to the promisee is susceptible of reasonably accurate
pecuniary measurement and the parties never intended that they should be
thus measured.
McLauchlin v. Gressette, 224 S.C. 296, 316, 79 S.E2d 149, 158 (1953).
54. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 14, 149-50 (1930).
55. This rule has not been specifically stated in South Carolina, but in every
case where specific performance has been decreed, the promisee's life was
changed, as by giving up former employment or moving into the promisor's
home. See McLauchlin v. Gressette, 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E2d 149 (1953) ; Kirk-
patrick v. Kirkpatrick, 223 S.C. 357, 75 S.E.2d 876 (1953); Baylor v. Bath,
189 S.C. 269, 1 S.E.2d 139 (1938); Annots., 69 A.L.R. 14, 133 (1930) and 106
A.L.R. 742, 758 (1937).
56. Samuel v. Young, 214 S.C. 91, 51 S.E2d 367 (1949) ; Prater v. Prater, 94
S.C. 267, 77 S.E. 936 (1913) ; Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1945) ;
McLaughlin v. Gressette, supra note 55; Kerr v. Kennedy, 105 S.C. 496, 90
S.E. 177 (1916); Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 223 S.C. 357, 75 S.E.2d 876
(1953) (grandnephew and half great-aunt); Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60, 35
S.E. 415 (1900) (apparently promisor and promisee not related).
57. 49 Am. JuR. Statute of Frauds § 529 (1943).
58. Samuel v. Young, 214 S.C. 91, 51 S.E2d 367 (1949) ; Bruce v. Moon, 57
S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1900).
59. Samuel v. Young, 214 S.C. 91, 51 S.E2d 367 (1949).
NoTs1965]
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If performance is to be rendered by two or more persons and
one dies or otherwise does not perform, the promisor can rescind.
However, if he intends to rescind he must notify the promisee
within a reasonable time or he may waive his right by allowing
the promisee to continue performance. 60
2. Referability of services to the contract. Not every perform-
ance by the promisee is sufficient to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds. The performance must be unequivocally referable to the
agreement.61 In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo (in a case
involving an oral promise to devise) "What is done must itself
supply the key to what is promised. It is not enough that what
is promised may give significance to what is done." 62 Apparent-
ly, the requirement of referability as expressed by Justice Car-
dozo is that the services performed must evidence the particular
contract that has been alleged, or at least that type of contract.
And, although a majority of cases in this county are disposed
of without mentioning this rule, it is evidently applied when
the facts clearly indicate that the performance was not referable
to the contract.
6 3
This rule, although never stated by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court in a land devise case, has been expressly recognized
with reference to oral contracts to convey.64 However, though
the situation is not entirely clear, it does appear that in South
Carolina, unlike New York,0 5 the performance need not be une-
guivocably referable to the agreement. It may be held sufficient
regardless of its being equally referable to some other agreement
than a contract to devise.66
3. Possession of the Promised Land. No South Carolina cases
have held that possession of the land is necessary. This is in con-
formity with the rule in all but those few jurisdictions which
regard possession as essential.67 However, possession and im-
provement in reliance on the promise to devise is generally re-
60. Prater v. Prater, 94 S.C. 267, 77 S.E. 936 (1913).
61. Annots., 69 A.L.R. 14, 129 (1930) and 106 A.L.R. 742, 757 (1937).
62. Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273 (1922).
63. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 14, 131 (1930).
64. Scurry v. Edwards, 232 S.C. 53, 100 S.E.2d 812 (1957) ; Aust. v. Beard,
230 S.C. 515, 96 S.E.2d 558 (1957).
65. Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273 (1922).
66. Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 223 S.C. 357, 75 S.E.2d 876 (1953); Mc-
Lauchlin v. Gressette, 224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E.2d 149 (1953); Baylor v. Bath,
189 S.C. 269, 1 S.E.2d 139 (1938).
67. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 14, 139 (1930).
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NoTEs
garded as sufficient part performance. Where possession is re-
quired it must be notorious, exclusive, and obviously in pursu-
ance of the contract; merely residing with and caring for the
promisor is insufficient. 6 In South Carolina either possession
alone69 or improvements alone7 0 may in some cases remove a
contract to convey from the statute. This could arguably be
applied to contracts to devise should such a case arise.
When the services rendered are incapable of monetary valua-
tion, South Carolina, with the majority, regards such services
as sufficient irrespective of possession. However, payment which
may be expressed in money or its equivalent is insufficient since
return of such consideration would restore the parties to their
original positions.71
E. Types of Part Performance
1. Promise to Devise to Another. Stuckey v. Truett72 con-
cerned a devise made pursuant to a return promise that the prom-
isor would devise the property to another. The South Carolina
Supreme Court held that by leaving the will in effect until his
death the promisee had fully performed, and the contract was
thereby removed from the Statute of Frauds.73 However, Stuck-
ey involved a promise between husband and wife, and since nam-
ing the husband as beneficiary is not necessarily referable to a
contract to devise to another, the case appears in serious conflict
with the requirement of unequivocal referability.
2. Surrender of a Child. Generally, the surrender of custody
of a child and the performance of filial services by the child is
sufficient performance to remove the promisee's promise to de-
vise to the child from the statute. 7- And, though one South Caro-
lina decision directly in point denied enforcement 75 the case has
68. Annots., 69 A.L.R. 14, 141 (1930) and 106 A.L.R. 742, 759 (1937).
69. Scurry v. Edwards, 232 S.C. 53, 100 S.E.2d 812 (1957).
70. Aust v. Beard, 230 S.C. 515, 96 S.E.2d 558 (1957).
71. Annots., 69 A.L.R. 14, 149 (1930) and 106 A.L.R. 742, 760 (1937).
72. 124 S.C. 122, 117 S.E. 192 (1923).
73. The rule cited by Justice Cothran in Stuckey v. Truett, supra note 72,
as supporting the creation of a constructive trust is contained in RESTATEM ENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 55 (1959). That rule and the one relied upon by Justice
Cothran seems to be that for a constructive trust to arise the person procuring
the devise must promise to hold the property on trust for a third person. This
was not the situation in this case, and the rule would seem not to apply.
74. Annots., 69 A.L.R. 14, 151 (1930) and 106 A.L.R. 742, 761 (1937).
75. Brown v. Golightly, 106 S.C. 519, 91 S.E. 869 (1917).
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not been followed.70 However, the court has implied a condition
of filial obedience and has denied specific performance when it
was not forthcoming.
7 7
3. Promise to Marry. Marriage is not sufficient part perform-
ance either to remove a contract from the Statute of Frauds
provision relating to transfers of interests in land or agreements
in consideration of marriage.7 8 Therefore, despite a promise to
marry being coupled with other promises which have been suf-
ficiently performed to remove the contract from the land trans-
fer provision, it is not removed from the statute.7 9 However,
this may not be true in South Carolina. 0
4. Joint or Mutual Wills. Joint or mutual wills not executed
pursuant to a contract may be revoked without notice8 l by either
76. While the holding of Brown v. Golightly, mopra note 75, that a contract
to devise could not be established by parol evidence alone has not been specifi-
cally overruled, it has been so distinguished and discredited as to be of no
authority for this point. In Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S.C. 122, 117 S.E. 192
(1923), the circuit court opinion adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court
stated that Brown v. Golightly did not hold that there could not be specific per-
formance based on part performance. In McMillan v. King, 193 S.C. 14, 7
S.E.2d 521 (1940), the court again adopted the opinion of the circuit court
which cited Brown v. Golightly as a specific holding by the South Carolina
Supreme Court that an agreement to devise land is not enforceable unless in
writing or taken out of the statute by a showing of part performance. In Young
v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1945), the court cited both the majority
and concurring opinions of Brown v. Golightly. In a dissenting opinion Mr.
Chief Justice Baker said that the case had, while not specifically by name, been
overruled time and again and was of no authority. In McLauchlin v. Gressette,
224 S.C. 296, 79 S.E.2d 149 (1953), the court cited Brown v. Golightly as the
one exception in modern times to the court's consistent recognition that the
Statute of Frauds is not a bar to specific performance of oral contracts to devise
where there has been part performance. This case seems to indicate that the
court recognized Brown v. Golightly as inconsistent with its holdings in other
similar cases and does not consider it as authority in South Carolina. Brown v.
Golightly was last cited in Looper v. Whitaker, 231 S.C. 219, 98 S.E.2d 266
(1957), in which the concurring opinion of Mr. justice Hydrick was cited as
saying that the evidence did not meet the required measure of proof as it was
not sufficiently clear, definite and certain.
77. The court, in Large v. Large, 232 S.C. 70, 100 S.E2d 825 (1957), denied
specific performance because the "deeded" child had failed to fulfill the obliga-
tion of filial obedience: the child left the foster home, and adopted a "do as I
care" attitude.
78. 49 Am. Jun. Statute of Frauds § 520 (1943).
79. Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1419, 1421 (1953).
80. In Hart v. Hart, 3 Desaus. Eq. 592 (S.C. 1813), the bride's father orally
gave her a house and lot on her wedding day. The father's will stated that
since he had given his daughter the property, she was not a legatee in his will.
In the action to declare the property part of the father's estate, the court recog-
nized the oral transfer as a marriage portion. The daughter and her husband
had moved into the house, so this case, while not directly in point, seems to indi-
cate that marriage coupled with possession is sufficient part performance.
81. Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S.C. 341, 84 S.E. 878 (1915).
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party8 2 at any time, either before or after the death of the other
party and despite the fact that the latter may have died leaving
his will in force 3 or that the survivor has received and enjoyed
the benefits.8 4 And if the wills are made pursuant to a contract,
either may revoke during the lifetime of the other upon notifica-
tion to him.85 It is generally held that the death of one party
before the other has revoked is not sufficient part performance
by the survivor to take the promise of the decedent out of the
Statute of Frauds.8 6 However, the rule may be otherwise in
South Carolina. Tumnipseed v. Birine8 7 held that the execution
and non-revocation by the surviving promisor was sufficient part
performance by him to remove the decedent's promise from the
statute. This case, however, dealt with an oral bequest and may
not be followed in the case of an oral devise.
If the devisee under a mutual will made pursuant to a contract
accepts the property, the courts usually grant specific perform-
ance finding either sufficient part performance or an estoppel.88
IV. QUANTUX MERUIT
If the promisee fails to establish the existence of the alleged
contract, or if the promisor has conveyed away the promised land
to a bona fide purchaser, the promisee's remedy is an action in
qua tum meruit to recover the money paid, the property deliv-
ered, or the value of the services rendered.8 9 The law implies a
promise on the part of the promisor to compensate the promisee
and no express contract need be shown,90 provided, of course, the
services have not been rendered as a gratuity.
With this remedy available, evidence introduced in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to prove an oral contract to devise will be rele-
vant to show the decedent's acceptance of the services and his
willingness to compensate. However, the law implies only a
82. Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1020, 1024 (1926).
83. Ellisor v. Watts, 227 S.C. 411, 88 S.E.2d 351 (1955).
84. Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79 (1905).
85. Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C. 497, 131 S.E.2d 502 (1963) ; Looper v. Whit-
aker, 231 S.C. 219, 98 S.E2d 266 (1957) ; Annot., 106 A.L.R. 742, 761 (1937).
86. 49 Am. JuL- Statute of Frauds § 522 (1943).
87. 57 S.C. 559, 35 S.E. 757 (1900). See also, 49 Am. JuR. Statute of Frauds
§522 (1943).
88. 49 Am. JULR Statute of Frauds § 522 (1943).
89. White v. McKnight, 146 S.C. 59, 143 S.E. 552 (1928); Annot., 69 A.L.R.
14, 90 (1930).
90. Hunter v. Hunter, 3 Strob. 321 (S.C. 1848).
1965] NoT~s
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss4/8
SouTn CAnoLiNA LAw REvimw
promise to compensate upon request ;91 the promisee has the bur-
den of proving he was to be paid by WiZ.92 If the promisee can
establish a promise to pay by will, the statute of limitations be-
gins to run upon the death of the promisor; if not, it runs from
the time the services were actually rendered.98
V. CONcrUsioN
In the area of part performance, South Carolina appears to
vary from the majority of jurisdictions in several respects. The
court has recognized in cases of oral contracts to convey land
that unequivocal referability of the acts of performance to the
contract is an essential element of the part performance doctrine.
However, the court has not made a point of applying the same
rule in cases of oral contracts to devise. It appears that once the
contract is established almost any diligently performed acts of
part performance will be sufficient.
All oral contracts to devise violate the Statute of Frauds, and
all the elements of part performance, including referability of
the services to the contract, should be required before specific
performance is granted. The position of the South Carolina
Supreme Court on this rule is in need of some clarification.
WhEw.D 0. BnowN
91. Hunter v. Hunter, supra note 90.
92. McConnell v. Crocker, 217 S.C. 334, 60 S.E.2d 673 (1950); Callum v.
Rice, 35 S.C. 551, 15 S.E. 268 (1892); Hunter v. Hunter, 3 Strob. 321 (S.C.
1848).
93. McConnell v. Crocker, supra note 92; Callum v. Rice, supra note 92.
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